This paper investigates to what extent risk management and corporate governance mitigate the involvement of banks in credit boom and bust cycles. Using a unique, handcollected dataset on 156 banks from Central and Eastern Europe during 2005-2012, we assess whether banks with stronger risk management and corporate governance display more moderate credit growth in the pre-crisis credit boom as well as a smaller credit contraction and fewer credit losses in the crisis period. With respect to bank governance we document that a higher share of financial experts on the supervisory board is associated with more rapid credit growth in the pre-crisis period and a larger contraction of credit in the crisis period, but not with larger credit losses. With respect to risk management we document that a strong risk committee is associated with more moderate pre-crisis credit growth but not with fewer credit losses in the crisis. We find no evidence of an organizational learning process among crisishit banks: those banks with the largest credit losses during the crisis are least likely to improve their risk management in the aftermath of the crisis.
Introduction
Over the past decade, the banking sectors of Central and Eastern European (CEE) have experienced an extraordinary credit boom and bust cycle. In the period prior to the financial crisis (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) annual growth of private credit averaged 38.57% with a peak of 52.14% in 2007. The credit boom in Eastern Europe far exceeded that in other emerging market regions (see Figure 1a ), but also outpaced credit growth in well-documented boom countries such as Spain. The credit boom in Eastern Europe ended abruptly with the financial crisis of 2008, and has left a legacy of credit losses in the region. Non-performing loans in the CEE region increased to an average of 11 percent (end-2011) from just above 3 percent in 2007 (see Figure 1b) . Completing the picture of a classic credit boom and bust cycle, nonperforming loans materialized most in those countries where the pre-crisis credit boom was the most extreme (see Figure 1c ).
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In this paper, we examine whether risk management and corporate governance within banks mitigated their involvement in the recent credit boom and bust cycle in Central and
Eastern Europe. We first analyze whether banks with better risk management and corporate governance had more moderate credit growth during the pre-crises period (2005) (2006) (2007) ) and a smaller contraction of credit in the crisis period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . We then examine whether banks with better risk management and corporate governance had lower credit losses during the crisis period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . Finally, we examine whether banks that experienced high credit losses during the crisis improve risk management and corporate governance more than banks that experienced low credit losses.
Our analysis is based on a unique dataset providing annual information on corporate governance, risk management and credit activity for 156 individual banks (39 domestic and 117 foreign banks), from 17 countries of Central and Eastern Europe over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . We hand-collect information on the risk-management structure and the composition of the supervisory board for each bank from the banks' annual reports, financial statements, capital adequacy and risk management reports and websites. We merge our hand-collected dataset on risk management and corporate governance with annual financial indicators extracted for each bank from Bankscope as well as with country-level regulation and supervision indicators for each country from the World Bank.
With respect to risk management our results document that the existence of a risk committee, i.e. a dedicated committee solely charged with monitoring and managing the risk management efforts within the bank, in particular, is associated with more moderate credit growth during the pre-crisis credit boom and a smaller contraction of credit in the crisis. That said risk committees are associated with larger rather than smaller credit losses in the crisis.
With respect to bank governance our results document that more financial experts on the supervisory board of a bank are associated with more rapid pre-crisis credit growth and a larger contraction of credit in the crisis. The latter finding confirms the results obtained by Minton et al. (2014) and are consistent with the idea that a more financially knowledgeable board encourages bank management to increase its risk-taking. However, we do not find that the share of financial experts on the board is associated with larger credit losses in the crisis.
Thus while expert board members seem to push credit expansion, they also seem to help contain credit risk. We further document that a higher share of foreign members in supervisory boards is associated with fewer non-performing loans, especially in countries with weak regulatory frameworks.
Finally, in line with Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) , we show that there is no evidence of a particular learning process by crisis-hit banks: banks that experience high credit losses during the crisis improve their risk management less than banks that experience low credit losses.
Our results primarily contribute to the recent literature on corporate governance and bank risk-taking. The failure of various governance mechanisms has often been cited among the key causes of the crisis (De Haan and Vlahu, 2013) . Beltratti and Stulz (2012) argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis and find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were more risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis. Kirkpatrick (2009) concludes that the financial crisis can, to an important extent, be attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find that banks with stronger risk-management functions in place before the onset of the financial crisis had lower tail risk, a smaller fraction of nonperforming loans, better operating performance, and higher annual returns during the crisis years, 2007 and 2008. Their results suggest that a strong and independent risk-management function can curtail tail-risk exposures at banks. Aebi et al. (2012) directly reports to the board of directors, exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and profitability during the crisis. Erkens et al. (2012) investigate the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Minton et al. (2014) show that financial expertise among independent directors of U.S. banks is positively associated with balance-sheet and market-based measures of risk in the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Overall, existing empirical research does not seem to support the proposition that better governance in banks leads to less risk before the crisis or better performance during the crisis (Stulz, 2014) . Our results complement these findings by documenting how risk management and corporate governance affect banks involvement in credit boom and bust cycles in an emerging market context.
We also contribute to the literature that examines the relationship between regulation and banks' risk taking. Regulation could be considered as a complementary, external governance force, which may be particularly relevant for banks with weak internal governance. Previous studies suggest that bank risk-taking responds to changes in domestic regulation and supervision (Barth et al., 2004; Buch and DeLong, 2008) . When regulatory constraints are removed, the outcome may critically depend on the interaction between corporate governance and firm behavior, particularly if behavior is not primarily driven by value maximization and if the regulatory constraints have been designed to inhibit risk-taking (Illueca et al., 2014) . Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the relationship between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities, depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. Their findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk-taking, depending upon the bank's corporate governance structure. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) show that the differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Ongena et al. (2013) find that foreign banks which have lower barriers to entry, tighter restrictions on bank activities, and higher minimum capital requirements in their home markets are display lower bank-lending standards abroad. Our findings complement this literature by documenting that host country regulation hardly seems to influence the relation between bank governance and bank involvement in credit boom and bust cycles.
Data
The dataset used in our research is composed of annual data for 156 commercial banks operating in the 17 countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Figure   2 . The number of banks per country range from 5 in Albania and Lithuania to 12 in Poland and Romania. In terms of home countries, most foreign banks in Central and Eastern European countries are from Austria (29), Italy (20) and Greece (13).
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Risk management and corporate governance
Our first set of indicators assesses the quality of risk management within a bank. The first indicator is the dummy variable CRO Present that identifies whether a Chief Risk 3 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. 4 One concern related to the empirical analysis is the potential heterogeneity among different financial institutions. The impact of the financial crisis arguably might differ across commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks and real estate and mortgage banks. To make sure that there is consistency across the sample, we restricted the investigation to the commercial banking sector, which comprises one of the largest segments of depository institutions in Europe (Chortareas et al., 2013) . 5 We classify banks into foreign and domestic banks depending on whether 50% or more of banks' shares are owned by foreigners or by central, local governments or domestic private actors (Claessens and van Horen, 2014) .
Officer (CRO) 6 responsible for bank-wide risk management is present within the bank. Keys et al. (2009) show that a stronger risk-management department inside the bank partially alleviates the moral hazard problem. Also, policy makers stress that banks should appoint a totally independent CRO responsible for the risk-management function across the entire organization, and for coordinating the activities of other units relating to the institution's riskmanagement framework (Walker 2009; CEBS, 2010) . The second indicator, CRO Executive, identifies whether the CRO is an executive officer of the bank. If the CRO is a member of the managing board, his influence and power are expected to be larger as compared to a CRO who is situated on the third management level (Aebi et al., 2012) . We would expect that having the CRO as a member of a managing board indicates, in general, stronger risk management.
The indicator Risk committee is equal to 1 if the bank has a dedicated committee solely charged with monitoring and managing risk-management efforts within the bank.
According to Walker (2009) , risk governance requires a dedicated standalone risk committee, apart from the Audit Committee or the Asset and Liability Management Committee; this standalone risk committee focuses on the current and forward-looking aspects of risk exposure. Landier et al. (2009) shows that a firm that has a CRO or a centralized riskmanagement committee at the board-level may make the firm less prone to taking risks that are detrimental to long-term firm value. Thus, we assume that having a CRO and a risk committee indicates better risk management. The indicator Reports to board identifies whether the key management-level risk committee reports directly to the bank's board of directors instead of to the CEO. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010) considers that the risk committee, responsible for advising the board on the bank's overall current and future risk tolerance/appetite and strategy, and for overseeing senior management's implementation of that strategy, should be at a board-level. Figure 3b shows that even within a given international banking group there is substantial variation in risk management across countries. The indicator Board size is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of directors on a bank's board. 7 We measure Board expertise by the share of expert members on the board. Similar to Güner et al. (2008) and Minton et al. (2014) , we classify a member of the supervisory board as an expert if he or she (i) has worked within a banking institution, (ii) currently works at a non-bank financial institution, (iii) has a finance-related role within a non-financial firm (e.g., CFO, accountant, treasurer, or VP finance), (iv) has a finance-related role within an academic institution (e.g., professor in finance, accounting, economics, business or financial law), or (v) has an economic studies background. Previous studies show that banks with more financial experts on their boards limit their risk exposure before the crisis and exhibit better stock-return performance during the crisis (Fernandes and Fich, 2013 Figure 3b and Table 1 Panel A, there is substantial variation of the Supervisory board index across banks prior to the crisis. Unsurprisingly, the structure of the supervisory board differs strongly between foreign and domestic banks: The share of expert members (92% vs. 78%) and foreign members (70% vs. 17%) is higher for foreign banks. By contrast, the share of independent members on supervisory boards is lower for foreign banks than domestic banks (15% vs. 25%). We also observe that foreign banks have, on average, slightly larger supervisory boards than domestic banks. Figure 3d shows that even within a given 8 A potential disadvantage of independent members of a supervisory board is that they may lack relevant firmspecific information (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) , which is likely to be especially problematic for small growth firms. It is less clear what the relationship between board independence and bank performance and risk-taking should be (see e.g. Pathan, 2009; Cornett et al., 2010; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Berger et al., 2013; Minton et al., 2014) . 9 Allen et al. (2013) stress that in the case of these banks the parent bank board members are the only ones with the knowledge and access to information to monitor the bank's risk. In addition, subsidiary boards are expected to benefit from the presence of board members with regional expertise. 10 See Appendix 3 for a full correlation matrix of risk management and corporate governance variables.
international banking group there is substantial variation in corporate governance across countries. Figure 3e shows that the Corporate governance index and Risk Management index are largely uncorrelated across banks prior to the crisis. Thus corporate governance and risk management do not seem to be used as substitutes in terms of containing the risk exposure of banks. This finding is also confirmed in Appendix 3 where we present a correlation matrix for our individual indicators of governance and risk management.
Credit Growth and Credit Losses
We focus our attention on the involvement of banks in the credit boom and bust cycle as measured by (i) rapid pre-crisis credit growth, (ii) a strong drop in credit growth from the pre-crisis to crisis period and (iii) a high non-performing loans ratio during the crisis. From Table 1 Panel A shows that the average annual rate of credit growth in the pre-crisis period is 49%. 11 The variation of pre-crisis credit growth across our sample is substantial with annual growth rates varying from 20% to 195%. We observe that the average credit growth pre-crisis of domestic banks (53.29%) is slightly higher than foreign banks (48.08%). This result is in line with Berger et al. (2014) who find that foreign banks are more conservative than domestic banks, and that during normal times foreign banks tend to lend to safer borrowers with lower interest rate spreads and to avoid borrowers with junk ratings.
During the crisis period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , annual credit growth dropped to an average level of 5.8%, again with lower growth rates in the case of foreign banks (3.9%) than domestic banks (10.9%). Figure 4a documents that across our sample credit growth during the crisis period is hardly correlated with pre-crisis credit growth. This implies that -as documented by Figure 4b -the strongest drop in credit growth from the pre-crisis to the crisis period was recorded by banks with the fastest credit growth before crisis.
11 49.48% represents the unweighted average of gross loan annual growth for all banks from our sample during the pre-crisis period. The average of gross loan annual growth weighted by total assets of banks during the precrisis period is 36.29%.
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Regarding NPLs during the crisis, the average bank had a non-performing loan ratio of 14.3% over the 2009-2012 period. The average level of NPLs for domestic banks (18.3%)
is substantially higher than for foreign banks (12.8). Figure 4c documents a strong correlation (0.39) between pre-crisis credit growth and NPLs during crisis: banks that display faster credit growth before the crisis report a higher level of NPLs during the crisis.
Bank regulation and supervision
We examine whether the relationship between corporate governance, risk- regulatory capital can include assets other than cash and government securities, and whether authorities verify the source of capital (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) . The third variable, Official supervisory power, is an index that expresses the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency to undertake actions such as demanding information, forcing a bank to change the internal organizational structure and obliging it to suspend dividend payments, and intervening in the bank's management.
We construct the Regulatory Index for all 17 host countries. We define a host country as a country with a lax regulation if the value of Regulatory index for that country is lower than the median value of Regulatory index for the entire sample of countries. The structure of our dataset, in terms of host-countries' regulation and supervision framework, is presented in Figure 5 . We observe that the highest levels of Regulatory index, meaning tight regulation, are recorded in Slovenia and Hungary. The countries with the lowest level of Regulatory index are Serbia and Montenegro. Table 1 
Bank-level control variables
Prior studies suggest a significant relationship between bank size, bank businessmodels and bank risk taking (Altunbas et al., 2011) . To control for differences in size and business models across our sample, we employ following bank-level control variables: 1)
Bank size measures (log) total assets of the bank in the pre-crisis period; 2) as in Beltratti and Stulz (2012) we use the Loans to total assets ratio captures the banks' investment strategy; 3)
following Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) we use Capital structure (Equity/Total assets) defined as regulatory capital divided by total assets. We winsorize the bank-level explanatory variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
From Table 1 Panel A we observe substantial differences in terms of Bank size across our sample: while the average volume of bank assets is 4.8 billion EUR, this ranges from 40 million USD to 38.1 billion across banks. Regarding asset structure, we observe that Loan to total assets ratio before the crisis ranges between 22% and 89%, with an average level of 59%. Foreign banks are on average larger than domestic banks (4.8 vs. 3.5 billion EUR), but display a similar loan to total asset ratio (60% vs. 56%). Similar to Gropp and Heider (2010),
we observe that there is a large variation in banks' capital ratios across CEE banking systems.
The ratio of book equity to book assets before crisis ranges from 3.43% to 35.72%, %, with an average level of 11.54%. Domestic banks are on average better capitalized than foreign banks (13.77% vs. 10.71%)
Results
Pre-crisis credit growth
We first analyze whether banks with better risk management and corporate governance are characterized by more moderate credit growth during the pre-crises credit boom. Table 2 presents results of a multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between pre-crisis Credit growth, risk management and corporate governance.
The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the average annual credit growth rate over the 2005-2007 period. We estimate 11 models using our full sample of banks. All models include host-country fixed effects and allow for clustering of standard errors at the country level.
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The With respect to the structure of the supervisory board the estimates obtained for
Model 5 suggests that (controlling for bank size) the size of the supervisory board is not associated with pre-crisis credit growth. Model 6 in Table 2 shows that more expert members on the supervisory board are associated with more rapid Credit growth during the pre-crisis period: A one-standard-deviation increase in Board expertise levels during the pre-crisis period is associated with an increase of 6.12 percentage points in pre-crisis Credit growth, compared to a mean pre-crisis Credit growth of about 49.4%. This result is in line with results obtained by Minton et al. (2014) and is consistent with financial experts who act in the interest of shareholders, as shareholders benefit from more risk-taking given that their cost of capital does not reflect the riskiness of their assets. Also, this result is consistent with a more financially knowledgeable board that has a better understanding of the lending business and that potentially encourages bank management to increase its risk-taking. While board expertise seems to influence pre-crisis credit growth this does not seem to be the case for the share of independent board members (Model 7) or foreign board members (Model 8).
Reflecting the varying results in Models 5-8, the composite Supervisory board index is not significantly associated with pre-crisis credit growth (Model 10).
The results obtained in Models 3, 4 and 6 of Table 2 show that, controlling for bank size, banks with stronger risk committees and fewer financial experts on their supervisory board are characterized by more moderate credit growth in the pre-crisis boom period. Within our sample, domestic banks have both stronger risk committees and fewer financial experts on their boards (see Table 1 ). However, these differences in risk management and board structure do not translate into a significant difference in pre-crisis credit growth between foreign and domestic banks (see Model 11). The lower pre-crisis credit growth for foreign banks (5.21 percentage points) displayed in Table 1 is partly attributable to differences in bank size between foreign and domestic banks. All models in Table 2 report a significant and large negative correlation between bank size and pre-crisis credit growth.
Credit growth during the crisis
Concerns about a dramatic credit crunch in the Central and Eastern European countries led to a concerted effort by regulators and multilateral institutions to preserve minimum levels of lending (De Haas et al., 2014) . The crisis triggered an increasing research effort to disentangle the factors that drove the fall of credit growth in most countries from this region (see e.g., Feyen et al., 2014; Choi et al., 2013) . In this section, we explore the role of risk management and corporate governance on banks credit activity during the crisis. In order to assess the impact of risk management and corporate governance on credit provision during the crisis we first examine the drop in credit growth from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period (Table 3 ). We then examine the level of credit growth in the crisis period (Table 4) . Table 2 for pre-crisis credit growth.
Also, we find that having more expert members on the supervisory board has a positive and statistically significant impact on Credit drop (Model 6). The magnitude of this effect is again similar to that obtained in Table 2 for pre-crisis credit growth. These results are not surprising as Figure 4b documents that those banks which boasted the fastest credit growth during the crisis were also responsible for the sharpest drop in credit growth once the crisis hit.
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Which banks do display the highest credit growth in the crisis? Figure 4a shows that the rate of credit growth during the crisis period varied substantially across our sample of banks and is almost unrelated to the rate of credit growth prior to the crisis. In Table 4 we examine to what extent bank governance and risk management are associated with in-crisis credit growth. The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is average annual credit growth over the 2009-2012 period.
With respect to risk management we find that the position of the chief risk officer is associated with Credit growth in the crisis. Banks with a CRO executive have, on average, an annual rate of Credit growth during the crisis which is 3 percentage points higher than banks without CRO executive. By comparison the average rate of credit growth during the crisis period is 5.8%.
In terms of board characteristics, we find that contrary to the pre-crisis period, banks with a larger Board size do not grow faster during the crisis (Model 5). The association is again both economically and statistically significant: a one-standard-deviation increase in
Board size during the pre-crisis period is associated with a decrease of 3.2% in Credit growth during the crisis.
Model (8) in Table 4 reports a large and negative, but not significant coefficient for Table 4 . Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient of Size of bank is similar to that reported for the pre-crisis period in Table 2 .
This finding suggests that large banks were not just more prudent in the pre-crisis credit boom, but were equally reluctant to expand lending during the crisis.
Credit losses during the crisis
In the previous sections we showed that good risk management (e.g. a strong risk committee) is associated with a more moderate pre-crisis credit growth, while more financial experts on the board are associated with a stronger involvement in the boom-bust cycle. In this section we examine to what extent differences in risk management and governance also affect realized credit losses during the crisis. This finding is somewhat surprising as the previous results suggest that these banks are characterized by a more stable credit growth during the boom-bust cycle. One explanation for this finding is that the presence of a risk committee that reports to the board forces management to recognize (rather than evergreen) credit losses during the crisis. An alternative explanation is that this result is driven by differences in the loan structure between banks which have a strong risk committee and banks that don't. Banks with strong risk management committees may require these because they have a larger relative credit exposure to the corporate sector (as opposed to the household sector). Existing evidence for
Emerging Europe suggests that the retail credit segment experienced stronger pre-crisis credit growth than the corporate lending segment (Brown and De Haas, 2012) . At the same time corporate borrowers are more likely to be directly hit by the economic crisis which spread to Eastern Europe from 2009 onwards. Unfortunately, we could obtain information on the credit portfolio structure for only 65 of the 156 banks in our sample. 15 The data for these banks confirms our conjecture that banks with a stronger focus on corporate credit are less involved in the credit-boom and bust cycle, but do experience higher credit losses during the crisis.
Thus the observed correlation between risk management and credit losses may well be driven by omitted information on credit portfolio structure.
With respect to the supervisory board, we do find that a larger share of foreign board members is associated with lower Credit losses during the crisis (Model 8). In terms of economic effects, a one-standard-deviation increase in Board foreign is associated with a 2.15% drop in the NPLs level during the crisis, relative to the NPLs mean during the crisis this is about 14.3%.
The role of the regulatory framework
The impact of the risk management and corporate governance on bank risk-taking may arguably differ across countries with a different level and quality of regulation The Appendix 4d results suggest that the relation between bank governance and incrisis credit losses does depend on regulation. In particular, the negative coefficient for the interaction term Board foreign * Lax regulation suggests that a higher share of foreign members in the supervisory board is associated with fewer non-performing loans in the crisis, especially in countries with a lax regulatory framework. This finding is confirmed by the significant negative interaction term for Foreign ownership * Lax regulation in the same table.
Changes in risk management and corporate governance
There is increasing evidence in the literature that past experiences of financial institutions affect their subsequent business model and performance (Power et al., 2013) . One may expect therefore that losses incurred by banks during the crisis may lead a bank to improve its risk management and governance structures. Alternatively, it could be the case that structural features of a bank's business model, risk management and governance that make the bank more sensitive to crises are too expensive to change or are not profitable (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) .
In order to assess the existence of a learning process from the crisis, we examine in Table 6 the changes in the Risk management index and Supervisory board index across banks from In Table 6 we examine whether banks which were hit hardest by the crisis improved their risk management and governance more than banks that were hit less by the crisis. We split our sample into banks with high (i.e. above median) NPLs in the crisis and banks with low (i.e. below median) NPLs in crisis. We then conduct a difference-in-difference analysis comparing average changes in the Risk management index and Supervisory board index from 2007 to 2012 for these two groups of banks.
The results presented in Table 6 show that both banks with high and low credit losses in the crisis improve their risk management significantly. Interestingly though, those banks that experienced more Credit losses during the crisis improve their Risk management index 
Conclusions
In this paper we use a unique, hand-collected dataset covering 156 banks in Central and Eastern Europe from 2005 through 2012, to examine how risk management and corporate governance influences bank involvement in a credit boom and bust cycle.
With respect to risk management we show that a strong risk committee is associated with more moderate pre-crisis credit growth but not with fewer credit losses. With respect to bank governance we document that a higher share of financial experts on the supervisory board is associated with more rapid credit growth in the pre-crisis period and a larger contraction of credit in the crisis period, but not with larger credit losses. A higher share of foreign members on the board of a bank is associated with fewer credit losses in the crisis, especially in countries with lax regulation. Finally, we find no evidence of an organizational learning process among crisis-hit banks: Those banks with the largest credit losses during the crisis are least likely to improve their risk management in the aftermath of the crisis.
Our results contribute to a better understanding of how bank governance may affect risk-taking in credit boom and bust cycles, especially in emerging economies. First, we confirm recent findings for the U.S. suggesting that banks were pushed by financial expert members on their boards to increase risk-taking in the pre-crisis credit boom (see Minton et al. 2014 
Figure 1b Non performing loans by region
This figure shows the development of NPLs ratio in Central and Eastern Europe comparing to other emerging market regions. NPLs ratio measured using Bank non-performing loans to gross loans (%) -Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to total gross loans (total value of loan portfolio) (Source Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)). The figure displays mean Index of regulation and supervisory framework by country during pre-crisis period. Pre-crisis denotes the period 2005-2007. We define a host country as a country with a lax regulation if the value of Index of regulation and supervisory framework for that country is lower than the median value of Index of regulation and supervisory framework for the entire sample of countries, otherwise as a country with a tight regulation. , are the control variables (Foreign ownership, Size of banks, Asset structure and Capital structure). In all models the sample is composed by all banks. We include Host country fixed effects α in all specifications to control for omitted variables at the country-level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. , are the control variables (Foreign ownership, Size of banks, Asset structure and Capital structure). In all models the sample is composed by all banks. We include Host country fixed effects in all specifications to control for omitted variables at the country-level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent , are the control variables (Foreign ownership, Size of banks, Asset structure and Capital structure). In all models the sample is composed by all banks. We include Host country fixed effects in all specifications to control for omitted variables at the country-level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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